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CONTRIBUTION IN PRIVATE
ANTITRUST SUITS
Federal courts, ostensibly following the common-law rule
against contribution among joint tortfeasors,1 have consistently
held that private antitrust defendants2 may not maintain contribu-
tion actions against companion wrongdoers.3 Applied in conjunc-
tion with the treble-damage remedy4 and joint and several liability,5
this rule may impose catastrophic losses on individual participants
in anticompetitive activities. The availability of contribution thus
assumes unusual importance in private antitrust litigation. This
Note examines the law of contribution in private antitrust suits,
identifies serious conceptual and practical weaknesses in the cur-
rent practice of denying contribution, and proposes a fresh ap-
proach that looks primarily to the nature of the antitrust violation.
1 The common-law rule bars jointly and severally liable tortfeasors from obtaining
reimbursement ("contribution") from their fellow wrongdoers of amounts paid in excess of
their pro rata share of the common liability. By the better view, the common-law rule was
created to deal only with intentional tortfeasors. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 306 (4th ed. 1971); Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly
Charged For Negligence-Meryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REv. 176, 177-78 (1898). This
view, however, has been slow to take hold among American jurisdictions, many of which
apply the rule equally to intentional and unintentional tortfeasors. See W. PROSSER, supra
§ 50, at 306. The basis of the rule, to the extent that a rational basis exists, lies in the
maxim that "no man can make his own misconduct the ground for an action in his own
favor.... The law cannot recognize equities as springing from a wrong in favor of one
concerned in committing it." I T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS § 89, at 291-92 (4th ed. 1932).
See generally Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL L. Q. 552
(1936).
2 Throughout this Note the phrase "private antitrust defendants" will refer to defen-
dants in civil treble-damage suits brought under § 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15
(1970)).
3 El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,533 (N.D. Cal.
1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American Pres. Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960) (dictum); Baughman v.
Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 671 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (dictum); Gould v. American-
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974) (dictum). But see Chevalier v. Baird Say.
Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 140, 145 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (dictum).
4 Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970)) provides: "Any person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
... shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained .... "
5 Antitrust co-conspirators are jointly and severally liable for the damages they inflict.
See Solomon v. Houston Corrugated Box Co., 526 F.2d 389, 392 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976);
Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11-12 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Washington v. American
Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D. Cal. 1968).
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I
BACKGROUND
A. Sabre Shipping
In more than eight decades of private antitrust litigation,6
courts have confronted the issue of contribution only twice. Sabre
Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd.,7 the ground-breaking
case, arose out of an alleged conspiracy among shipping firms to
destroy the plaintiff's business.8 The immediate issue before the
court was the substantive right of a private antitrust defendant to
implead certain alleged co-conspirators with whom the plaintiff
had settled and had covenanted not to sue.9 In effect, the cove-
6 Private antitrust actions were first authorized by the Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26
Stat. 211 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970)).
7 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
' The plaintiff contended that competing shipping firms had retaliated against the
plaintiff's refusal to join their trade group by cutting their rates and driving the plaintiff
into bankruptcy, in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The plaintiff sought $49
million in damages and attorneys' fees. Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American Pres. Lines,
Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949, 950-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), cert. denied, 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969).
9 The settling defendants' agreement with the original plaintiff was a "covenant not to
sue," and not a "release." Although the two devices appear to achieve the same goal, they
can have different legal effects. A covenant not to sue is a contractual obligation. When
Sabre Shipping Corp. (Sabre) covenanted not to sue the settling defendants, it agreed, for
consideration, to refrain from asserting a particular cause of action. The outstanding liabil-
ity, however, remained in existence. If Sabre had sued in violation of the covenant, the
action would not have been dismissed, but Sabre would have been subject to a counterclaim
for breach of contract. See, e.g., Aiken v. Insull, 122 F.2d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 315 U.S. 806 (1942). A release would have operated differently. Had Sabre released
the settling defendants, their liabilities would have been extinguished and the release
would constitute an affirmative defense to an action by Sabre. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
This difference in the operation of covenants not to sue and releases acquired great
importance at common law. Because common-law courts viewed joint tortfeasors as causing
indivisible injury, they developed the so-called "unity of release" rule under which the
release of one joint tortfeasor released all of the others:
It is, we think, clear law, that a release granted to one joint tortfeasor, or to
one joint debtor, operates as a discharge of the other joint tortfeasor, or the other
joint debtor, the reason being that the cause of action, which is one and indivisi-
ble, having been released, all persons otherwise liable thereto are consequently
released.
Duck v. Mayeu, [1892] 2 Q.B. 511, 513. See McCloskey v. Porter, 161 Mont. 307, 316-17,
506 P.2d 845, 850 (1973) (concurring opinion); Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Mark-
ing Corp., 18 N.J. 467, 470-71, 114 A.2d 438, 439-40, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834 (1955). Be-
cause it left the underlying cause intact, the covenant not to sue did not share this undesir-
able side effect.
In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 346-47 (1971), the
Supreme Court abolished the "unity of release" rule in an antitrust context, thereby erod-
ing the distinction between releases and covenants not to sue. The irrevocable nature of
releases, however, remains as a basis for the distinction.
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nants subjected the remaining defendants to the entirety of the
plaintiff's claim, 10 no matter how small their role in the conspiracy.
A number of the nonsettling defendants therefore sought to com-
pel the settling defendants to contribute their proportional shares
of any eventual liability. 1
The district court dismissed the third-party complaint.12 The
court reasoned that federal common law supplies the governing
rules of decision in causes of action created by federal statutes, that
there is no right of contribution among joint tortfeasors at federal
common law, and that therefore a private antitrust defendarkt
could not maintain an action for contribution.' 3 This syllogistic
analysis drew support, in the court's view, from two additional
considerations. First, in contrast to the securities laws,' 4 the anti-
trust laws do not provide for contribution. This omission "dem-
onstrate[d] .. .that Congress, aware of the rule against contribu-
tion, saw fit to provide for it explicitly in the securities statutes but
not in the enforcement of antitrust laws which dominate so much
of our litigation, and that no such right should be implied."' 5 Sec-
ond, the court feared that contribution among defendants might
impede prompt recoveries by original plaintiffs:
If one or two defendants sued by a plaintiff ... could turn
around and implead all other persons directly and indirectly in-
volved in the alleged conspiracy .... control of [the plaintiff's]
action would be taken out of his hands. It would operate to
prevent his receiving prompt recovery since no defendant would
settle with him if he was to find himself back in the suit as a third
party defendant.' 6
The scope of the holding in Sabre Shipping has prompted con-
siderable controversy. Two federal decisions have cited the case for
the broad proposition that contribution is generally unavailable to
10 Antitrust co-conspirators are jointly and severally liable. See note 5 supra. Neverthe-
less, the nonsettling defendants would le entitled to a set-off in an amount equal to the
total consideration paid in settlement. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
401 U.S. 321, 348 (1971).
"1 The nonsettling defendants argued that "if the acts alleged were done, they were
the joint acts of third party plaintiffs and third party defendants [and] that any liability of
the [third-party plaintiffs] will arise out of their joint acts ...." 298 F. Supp. at 1341.
1Id. at 1346.
13Id. at 1343-46. The court cited no authority for the critical proposition that the
third-party plaintiff was in fact a tortfeasor.
14 Securities Act of 1933, § 11(f), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), and Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, §§ 9(e), 18(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78r (1970), expressly provide for contribution.
15 298 F. Supp. at 1345.
16 d. at 1346.
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private antitrust defendants. 17 The holding, however, can be read
as applying only to intentional violators of the antitrust laws. 1 8
Thus, the court in Sabre Shipping recognized that the District of
Columbia Circuit permitted contribution among unintentional
tortfeasors, but stated: "Since even there the rule is limited to unin-
tentional torts, it emphasizes the difference between those and in-
tentional torts, as we have here, and [would] be of no avail to third
party plaintiffs even if applicable."' 9
By its reference to "intentional torts," the court might have
meant either that all "antitrust torts" are intentional torts, or simply
that the particular third-party plaintiffs then before it were inten-
tional tortfeasors.20 Because of this ambiguity, a court narrowly
construing Sabre Shipping might deny contribution only to inten-
tional violators of the antitrust laws. Whether the decision ex-
tended to unintentional violators as well became the central issue in
the only other case to consider the contribution issue on its merits,
El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co.21
B. El Camino Glass
In El Camino Glass, automotive glass dealers charged their
suppliers with price-fixing and other antitrust violations. One of
the named defendants sought to implead an alleged co-conspirator
who had not been joined in the original action. The third-party
plaintiff hoped to avoid the holding of Sabre Shipping by asserting
that any violation of the antitrust laws it had committed had been
"at most unintentional and in good faith. 2 2 The district court
granted the third-party defendant's motion to dismiss, 23 and the
Ninth Circuit refused to hear an interlocutory appeal on the con-
tribution issue.2 4
17 El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,533, at
72,111 (N.D. Cal. 1976); DiBenedetto v. United States, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-692, at 75-1504
(D.R.I. 1974).
"
8 See Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 671, 678 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
19 298 F. Supp. at 1345.
20 A subsequent statement in the opinion is equally ambiguous:
If the Supreme Court [in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.,
342 U.S. 282 (1952)] was reluctant to depart from the rule as between uninten-
tional tortfeasors, whose sole culpability was one of lack of care, how presumptu-
ous it would be for this Court to do so for the benefit of intentional wrongdoers,
whose acts are so severely castigated by Congress, to the point of providing crimi-
nal sanctions including imprisonment.
298 F. Supp. at 1346.
21 [1977-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,533 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
2 2 Id. at 72,111.
23Id. at 72,112.
24 United Glass Co. v. Michaels, No. 76-8162 (9th Cir., filed June 22, 1976).
1978] 685
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The district court adopted Sabre Shipping's reasoning that the
federal common-law rule against contribution among joint tort-
feasors applied to bar the third-party complaint.25 Although the
court stated that this analysis did not depend on whether the de-
fendant's conduct had been intentional,2 6 it felt constrained to con-
sider whether lack of intent should affect a private antitrust de-
fendant's entitlement to contribution. The court took cognizance
of "the considerations of equity and fairness which underlie the
modern trend towards permitting contribution in cases of unin-
tentional torts,"27 and weighed them against, what it perceived as
countervailing considerations: a congressional intent that anti-
trust liability be determined without regard to the defendant's
state of mind; the detrimental effect that contribution might have
on plaintiffs' attempts to control the size and scope of their law-
suits; and the possibility that denying contribution would further
deter antitrust violations.28 The court concluded that "the ends of
justice [would] be better served by holding that contribution is not
available in an antitrust suit. '29 Notably, however, the court cer-
tified an immediate interlocutory appeal because its order involved
a question of law "as to which there is substantial ground for dif-
ference of opinion. 30
II
A CRITIQUE OF Sabre Shipping AND El Camino Glass
Although both Sabre Shipping and El Camino Glass advanced
secondary policy considerations for denying contribution, both de-
cisions rested on the following syllogism: (1) the federal common
law does not permit contribution among joint tortfeasors; (2) anti-
5 [1977-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,533, at 72,111. As in Sabre Shipping, the court
adduced no authority for the proposition that the third-party plaintiff was in fact a
tortfeasor.
2 6 Id. at 72,111 n.2. The contribution rule enunciated in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship
Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952), upon which El Camino Glass relied, applied
to unintentional tortfeasors. See note 20 supra.
2" [1977-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,533, at 72,112.
2 8 Id. The court adverted to a number of other considerations as well, but did not rely
on them. These included the points raised in Sabre Shipping regarding congressional intent
and hardship on private antitrust plaintiffs (see text accompanying notes 14-16 supra), the
complexity of antitrust litigation, and the apparent inappropriateness of injecting the issue
of a defendant's state of mind into an antitrust case. [1977-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,533,
at 72,112.
29 [1977-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) V 61,533, at 72,112.
30 Id. at 72,112-13.
[Vol. 63:682
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trust violators are tortfeasors; (3) therefore, contribution is not
available among private antitrust defendants. Each of these steps
rests on faulty analysis.
A. The Federal Common Law of Contribution
Both Sabre Shipping and El Camino Glass properly looked to
federal common law for the appropriate rules of decision.3 1 Since
the courts in both cases implicitly assumed that the plaintiffs' anti-
trust claims sounded in tort, they began their analyses by examining
the federal common-law rule regarding contribution among joint
tortfeasors. Both opinions relied heavily on the Supreme Court's
decision in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.32 for
the proposition that no right of contribution exists among joint
31 At issue in both cases were substantive rights created entirely by federal law; thus,
the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), was inapplicable, and the courts
were free to apply federal rules of decision. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
However,
even in situations where the federal courts are not bound by the constitutional
principles underlying Erie to apply state law, they might refrain from enunciating
a federal rule applicable throughout the nation. The presence of a federal pro-
gram permits the federal courts to make a choice, but does not of itself determine
what the choice will be.
United States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1967). In determining whether to
apply federal or state law in such cases, the court must balance the need for a federal rule
to effectuate a congressional program against principles of federalism favoring minimum
interference in matters of state policy. See generally Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal
Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U.
PA. L. REv. 797 (1957). This discretion in choosing rules of decision allows the application
of state law to interstitial questions in federal antitrust litigation. See Three Rivers Motors
Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 888-93 (3d Cir. 1975). See generally Note, The Role of
State Law in Federal Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1395 (1962). For this
reason, neither the Sabre Shipping court nor the El Camino Glass court was bound to apply
federal common law.
32 342 U.S. 282 (1952). The Sabre Shipping court also cited Union Stock Yards Co. v.
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 196 U.S. 217 (1905). Although in dictum it mentioned the no-
contribution rule (id. at 224), Union Stock Yards involved not a contribution but an in-
demnity claim. Id. at 223. Since contribution and indemnity are distinct concepts (see W.
PROSSER, supra note 1, § 51, at 310-11), Union Stock Yards does not directly apply to con-
tribution cases such as Sabre Shipping. See George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126
F.2d 219, 222-23 (D.C. Cir. 1942). Moreover, Union Stock Yards arose before Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and involved federal general common law. If the same case
were to arise today, based on diversity jurisdiction, Erie would require federal courts to
apply state contribution law. Federal common law only applies to cases like Sabre Shipping
that are based on federal questions, for instance, the antitrust statutes. Courts deciding
antitrust cases, therefore, should not blindly adhere to pre-Erie federal common law.
Rather, they should exercise independent judgment by considering the policies underlying
the statutes creating jurisdiction and frame rules of contribution consistent with those
policies.
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tortfeasors at federal common law. That case, however, is not in
point. Halcyon had hired Haenn to repair Halcyon's ship. An
employee of Haenn suffered injuries while making the repairs, and
sued Halcyon for negligence. Halcyon in turn impleaded Haenn
for contribution. The Court denied Halcyon's contribution claim,33
but not because of the common-law rule against contribution
among joint tortfeasors, or any other common-law precept; the
Court was exercising not a common-law but an admiralty jurisdic-
tion.3 4 At issue in Halcyon was the scope of the special maritime
"moiety rule"3 5-a doctrine of damage apportionment "distinct
from the right of contribution at law, not dependent on subroga-
tion or any other equitable doctrine, and arising from the wrong
itself. "36 The moiety rule provided that "[w]here two vessels collide
due to the fault of both, . . . the mutual wrongdoers shall share
equally the damages sustained by each, as well as personal injury
and property damage inflicted on innocent third parties."3 7 The
Court rejected Halcyon's argument that the rule should be ex-
tended to noncollision cases, and should be modified to allow an
apportionment of damages based upon the wrongdoers' degree of
fault.38 The Court relied primarily on Congress's refusal to enact
such a rule, despite its extensive legislation in the area. 39 The Court
also sought to justify its decision, however, by venturing beyond its
admiralty jurisdiction and referring to common-law principles:
In the absence of legislation, courts exercising a common-law
jurisdiction have generally held that they-cannot on their own
initiative create an enforceable right of contribution as between
joint tortfeasors. This judicial attitude has provoked protest on
33 342 U.S. at 286-87.
31 "A case in admiralty does not, in fact, arise under the Constitution or laws of the
United States. These cases are as old as navigation itself; and the law, admiralty and
maritime, as it has existed for ages, is applied by our Courts to the cases as they arise."
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545-46 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.).
3' See generally Staring, Contribution and Division of Damages in Admiralty and Maritime
Cases, 45 CALIF. L. Rav. 304 (1957).
36 Id. at 344.
37 Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. at 284.
3 8 1d. at 286-87. The Supreme Court recently altered the method of allocation in
United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975):
[W]hen two or more parties have contributed by their fault to cause property
damage in a maritime collision or stranding, liability for such damage is to be
allocated among the parties proportionately to the comparative degree of their
fault, and .. .liability for such damages is to be allocated equally only when the
parties are equally at fault or when it is not possible fairly to measure the com-
parative degree of their fault.
39 See 342 U.S. at 285-86.
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the ground that it is inequitable to compel one tortfeasor to bear
the entire burden of a loss which has been caused in part by the
negligence of someone else. Others have defended the policy of
common-law courts in refusing to fashion rules of contribution.
To some extent courts exercising jurisdiction in maritime affairs
have felt freer than common-law courts in fashioning rules, and
we would feel free to do so here if wholly convinced that it would
best serve the ends of justice.40
The courts in Sabre Shipping and El Camino Glass found in this
passage a broad holding that joint tortfeasors may not maintain
actions for contribution at federal common law. 41 Since common-
law contribution was not an issue in Halcyon, however, the passage
at best constitutes dictum, evidencing the Court's ambivalent at-
titude toward contribution generally, which might have influenced
its decision not to extend the special maritime rule of contri-
bution.42
The Court's subsequent decision in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v.
Fritz Kopke, Inc. 43 casts further doubt on Halcyon's worth as a prece-
dent prohibiting common-law contribution. As in Halcyon, the Court
faced the issue of contribution among joint tortfeasors in a noncol-
lision maritime context. A stevedore sued Kopke for injuries sus-
tained while loading Kopke's ship. Kopke impleaded Cooper for
contribution, claiming that Cooper's negligent loading of the ship
at an earlier point on its route had created the dangerous condition
that led to the plaintiff's injury. Responding to Cooper's argument
that Halcyon precluded contribution on these facts, the Court pur-
ported to clarify its earlier holding:
[W]e think Halcyon stands for a more limited rule than the abso-
lute bar against contribution in noncollision cases urged upon us
by petitioner.
• . . Since .the- [plaintiff in Halcyon] was covered by the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ....
he was prohibited from suing his employer Haenn....
40 Id. at 285 (footnotes omitted). For a more recent expression of misgivings about
permitting contribution among joint tortfeasors, see Howard v. Spafford, 132 Vt. 434,
435-36, 321 A.2d 74, 75 (1974).
41 See El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,533, at
72,111; Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American Pres. Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. at 1344.
42 "As was inevitable when the 'maritime law' was placed in the hands of judges trained
in the Anglo-American common law tradition, maritime law-amongst us has been heavily
influenced, substantively and methodologically, by shoreside law." G. GiLMoRE & C. BLACK,
THE LAw oF ADMIRALTY 46 (1974).
43417 U.S. 106 (1974).
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... Confronted with the possibility that any workable rule of
contribution might be inconsistent with the balance struck by
Congress in the Harbor Workers' Act between the interests of
carriers, employers, employees, and their respective insurers, we
refrained from allowing contribution in the circumstances of that
case. 
44
The Court thus construed Halcyon's denial of contribution as
nothing more than an effort to preserve a federal workmen's com-
pensation scheme.4 5 The plaintiff in Cooper Stevedoring, however,
was an employee of neither Kopke nor Cooper; since he could
have sued both and made Cooper "bear its fair share of the dam-
ages caused by its negligence," the Court saw "no reason why
[Kopke] should not be accorded the same right."46 The Court
noted that "the principle of division of damages in admiralty has,
over the years, been liberally extended by this Court in directions
deemed just and proper"; 47 in the absence of countervailing statu-
tory policies, it felt free to continue this trend. Most important, the
Court's language belies Halcyon's suggestion that contribution
among joint tortfeasors is a concept of uncertain merit, not war-
ranting judicial extension: "[A] 'more equal distribution of justice'
can best be achieved by ameliorating the common-law rule against
contribution which permits a plaintiff to force one of two
wrongdoers to bear the entire loss, though the other may have
been equally or more to blame. 48
A comparison of two recent non-admiralty cases, DiBenedetto v.
United States4 9 and Cohen v. United States,50 illustrates Cooper Stevedor-
ing's impact on the federal law of contribution. The issue in each
case was whether to permit contribution among persons who are
jointly and severally liable for certain tax evasion penalties under
the Internal Revenue Code.5 1 DiBenedetto, like Sabre Shipping and El
44 Id. at 11 1-12 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
4" See id. at 112-13. Courts frequently prohibit third-party contribution actions in order
to protect the integrity of workmen's compensation programs. See 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW
OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 76.21 (1976).
46 417 U.S. at 113.
47 Id. at 110.
41Id. at 111 (quoting The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 14 (1890)).
49 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-692 (D.R.I. 1974).
50 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-670 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
5' I.R.C. § 6672 provides in part:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax
imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for
and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any
690 [Vol. 63:682
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Camino Glass, relied on Halcyon for the proposition that "in the
absence of specific statutory authority, there exists no federal
common-law right of contribution. '52 Thus, the DiBenedetto court
left the matter of contribution under the applicable section of the
Internal Revenue Code to congressional discretion. 53
Cohen approached the contribution issue from a different
perspective:
The Di Benedetto court relied on [Halcyon] for the proposition
that there can be no federal right of contribution "in the absence
of specific statutory authority for it." . . . Cohen's attack on
Di Benedetto is based on a subsequent Supreme Court case
clarifying Halcyon. That case is Cooper Stevedoring Co., Inc. v.
Fritz Kopke, Inc....
... Cooper Stevedoring can be read as permitting federal
courts to apply the general rules of contribution unless there are
policy considerations mitigating against such application. 54
Relying on this interpretation of Cooper Stevedoring, the Cohen court
analyzed the nature of the tax penalty involved, and took note of
the requirement of "willfulness" as a prerequisite to liability.55 Be-
cause the conduct of a liable defendant was necessarily "willful,"
the court reasoned, the defendant could not seek contribution
from a companion wrongdoer.56 This concentration on the defen-
dant's state of mind seems to depart from the rule of contribution
enunciated in Halcyon and followed in Sabre Shipping, El Camino
Glass, and DiBenedetto. In Halcyon and El Camino Glass, it made no
difference that the defendants had inflicted harm unintentionally.
such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by
law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not
collected, or not accounted for and paid over....
The statute "imposes joint and several liability upon responsible persons." Hertz, Personal
Liabilities of the Unsuspecting Executive for Penalties Under Section 6672 and Other Nightmares, in
32 N.Y.U. INsTrrrrE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 1171, 1185 (1974) (emphasis in original),
quoted in DiBenedetto v. United States, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-692, at 75-1504.
52 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-692, at 75-1504.
" "Any argument that a right of contribution should exist among 'responsible persons'
under this section of the Internal Revenue Code should be left to the sound discretion of
the Congress, and not to this Court." Id. at 75-1505.
54 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-670, at 75-1446.
55Id. at 75-1446. 75-1447.
56 "[E]ven if we conclude that contribution is not inconsistent with sound policy, the
applicable rules of contribution would still bar Cohen's claim against Meyer. This is be-
cause, under the general principles of contribution, there is no right to contribution on
behalf of willful wrongdoers." Id. at 75-1446.
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The common-law rule, as those courts perceived it, did not distin-
guish between intentional and unintentional tortfeasors. 57 The dis-
tinction, however, acquires significance in those jurisdictions that
have relaxed the common-law rule as among unintentional tort-
feasors. 58 Cohen's application of a state-of-mind criterion accords
with the modern trend.
Cooper Stevedoring and Cohen suggest a relaxation of the federal
law of contribution with respect to unintentional tortfeasors. At the
very least, it is clear that Halcyon, as clarified by Cooper Stevedoring,
does not stand for a general rule denying contribution among all
joint tortfeasors at either maritime or federal common law. By
relying on Halcyon, both Sabre Shipping and El Camino Glass mis-
construed the scope of the common-law rule.59
B. Applicability of Contribution Restrictions to Antitrust Defendants
Both Sabre Shipping and El Camino Glass dismissed contribution
claims on the ground that federal common law precluded contribu-
tion among joint tortfeasors. Neither case, however, attempted to
substantiate the fundamental assumption that private antitrust ac-
tions sound in tort. As its name suggests, the rule against contribu-
tion among joint tortfeasors has no application to joint obligors
whose liability is nontortious. 60 Even those jurisdictions that con-
'7 See Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. at 285-87; text
accompanying notes 25-30 supra.58 See, e.g., UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 1 (a), (c) (adopted by
18 states). See generally note 1 supra.
59 The court in El Camino Glass acknowledged Cooper Stevedoring, but distinguished it
on the ground that the Supreme Court had "emphasized the well-established maritime rule
allowing contribution among joint tort-feasors." [1977-11 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,533, at
72,111-12. This treatment is incomplete. Cooper Stevedoring was a noncollision case in which
the Court took a "modern," approving view of contribution, implicitly discrediting the Hal-
cyon dictum upon which El Camino Glass relied. See text accompanying notes 43-48 supra.
60 "[C]ontribution 'is not restricted to any special relation, but applies to any relation,
except that ofjoint tort-feasor, where equity between the parties is equality of burden, and one
discharges more than his share of the common obligation.'" Baldridge v. Flothow, 123
Neb. 218, 222, 242 N.W. 414, 416 (1932) (quoting 13 C.J. Contribution § 12 (1917)) (em-
phasis added). Accord, Bohlen, supra note 1, at 553-55 (except with respect to joint
tortfeasors, right of contribution is "universal"); 18 C.J.S. Contribution § 8 (1939). Some
sources express the rule as denying contribution among "tortfeasors or wrongdoers" (see,
e.g., 18 AM. JUR. 2D Contribution §§ 33, 35 (1965)), thus causing confusion as to whether the
latter word is used-as is common practice-as a synonym for "tortfeasors," or whether it
includes nontortious conduct as well. The weight of authority, however, seems to be that
"wrongdoer," in the contribution context, is coterminous with "tortfeasor":
In Merryweather v. Nixan [101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799)], the first and lead-
ing case which denied contribution between tortfeasors one of whom had paid the
damages for which at the election of the injured person both were liable, ...
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tinue to adhere to the common-law rule allow contribution among
joint obligors whose liability arises, for example, by way of contrac-
tual undertaking. 61 In denying contribution on the basis of the
common-law rule, both Sabre Shipping and El Camino Glass appar-
ently assumed that antitrust violators are necessarily tortfeasors.
Although courts have often characterized antitrust violators as
"tortfeasors,"' 62 such generalization is inappropriate. Whether a
private antitrust suit sounds in tort ought to depend on the particu-
lar nature of the violation.
The antitrust laws embrace certain common-law "competitive
torts."6 3 Most private antitrust liability, however, has no direct
common-law analogue. Prior to the Sherman Act, contracts that
counsel for the defendant advanced the proposition that there could not be con-
tribution between 'joint wrongdoers"....
However, Meryweather v. Nixan has been treated as authority for denying con-
tribution where the claimant is a "wrongdoer" only in the sense that the circumstances
are such as to subject him to liability in a tort action ....
Bohlen, supra note 1, at 555 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). A more recent analysis
suggests that the word "wrongdoer," when used in the contribution context, is even more
circumscribed, referring only to intentional tortfeasors. See Dawson v. Contractors Transp.
Corp., 467 F.2d 727, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion, Fahy, J.).
Although most federal courts routinely equate "tortfeasor" and "wrongdoer" when dis-
cussing contribution (see, e.g., Brightheart v. McKay, 420 F.2d 242, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Stafford Metal Works, Inc. v. Cook Paint and Varnish Co., 418 F. Supp. 56, 58 (N.D. Tex.
1976)), one court has stated that the rule denying contribution among joint tortfeasors
applies "not merely to tortfeasors but to all 'wrongdoers,'" thus implying that
"wrongdoers" has a wider field of reference. Cohen v. United States, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-
670, at 75-1447 (E.D. Mich. 1975). The authorities the court cited, however, seem to treat
"wrongdoers" in this context either as synonymous with "tortfeasors," or as referring more
specifically to intentional tortfeasors. See Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia,
161 U.S. 316, 327-28 (1896); George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219,
220-22 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Moyses v. Spartan Asphalt Paving Co., 383 Mich. 314, 331, 334,
174 N.W.2d 797, 804, 806 (1970); 18 AM. JUR. 2D Contribution § 35 (1965). See also Bohlen,
supra note 1, at 552 n.1. But cf. DiBenedetto v. United States, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-692 (D.R.I.
1974) (no common-law right of contribution among intentional tax law violators).6 1 See, e.g., Karnatz v. Murphy Pac. Corp., 8 Wash. App. 76, 81-82, 503 P.2d 1145,
1149 (1972). "It is ... somewhat ironic to note that at common law contribution is denied
among all tortfeasors and is allowed as a matter of course to one who has deliberately
chosen to violate a contractual obligation undertaken with others." Commissioners' Prefa-
tory Note (1939 Act), UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT.
"
2 See, e.g., Solomon v. Houston Corrugated Box Co., 526 F.2d 389, 392 n.4 (5th Cir.
1976); United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565, 571
(N.D. Il1. 1975); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Ayers v.
Pastime Amusement Co., 259 F. Supp. 358, 359 (D.S.C. 1966). Cf. Bravman v. Bassett Furn.
Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 1977) (earlier cases held "that there is not a sufficient
difference in kind between an antitrust tort and any other tort that § 4 should be interpreted
as affording a cause of action which would not otherwise exist").
" See Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REv. 888, 925-32 (1964).
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unreasonably restrained trade6 4 were illegal only in the sense that
they were unenforceable; they gave no affirmative rights to third
parties.65 This defensive approach of the common law to much of
what is now actionable in private antitrust suits provides no basis
for characterizing particular violations. The Clayton Act itself, by
stating obliquely that a private claimant may have recourse for
injuries "in his business or property,"6 6 provides little guidance in
this regard. The nature of the private antitrust liability, therefore,
has been a matter of judicial construction.
Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp.6 7 presents the only
carefully reasoned analysis of the essential character of private anti-
trust liability. 68 The plaintiff, a trustee-in-bankruptcy for the In-
land Gas Corporation, alleged that the defendant, a former com-
petitor of Inland, had violated section 7 of the Clayton Act 69 by
purchasing a controlling block of Inland stock. The plaintiff
claimed that the defendant used this unlawfully obtained control to
force Inland to abandon a pipeline project essential to Inland's
continued survival. The defendant allegedly appropriated the pro-
ject to itself, thereby pushing Inland into bankruptcy.
The issue before the court was whether the statute of limita-
tions for debt upon a specialty or for trespass on the case (tort)
'4 These included contracts "for the restriction or suppression of competition in the
market, agreements to fix prices, divide marketing territories, apportion customers, restrict
production and the like practices, which tend to raise prices or otherwise take from buyers
or consumers the advantages which accrued to them from free competition in the market."
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 497 (1940). See Dewey, The Common-Law
Background of Antitrust Policy, 41 VA. L. REv. 759, 784-86 (1955).
65 See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 497 (1940); United States v. Addys-
ton Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898) (dictum), modified on other grounds, 175
U.S. 211 (1899); Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 233-34, 55 N.W. 1119, 1121
(1893); Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., [1892] A.C. 25, 51 (1891). An important
exception to this treatment of contracts in unreasonable restraint of trade arose in cases of
"[a] conspiracy to create a monopoly in commodities which constitute the necessities of life,
or to enhance the market price thereof"; a conspiracy of this type was a criminal offense.
State v. Duluth Bd. of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 530, 121 N.W. 395, 404-05 (1909).
66 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
6:7 110 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 639 (1940).
's Courts display remarkable casualness in characterizing antitrust violations as torts.
See cases cited in note 62 supra.
69 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1970)). At the time Williamson was decided, the section provided in pertinent part:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation en-
gaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substan-
tially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and
the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any sec-
tion or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.
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governed the plaintiff's action. In affirming that the tort statute of
limitations applied to bar the claim, the Third Circuit adopted a
thoughtful approach. The court first acknowledged that the anti-
trust statutes had created a private right of action "which up to that
time had received no judicial recognition. ' 70 The court therefore
sought to ascertain the common-law form of action that most
closely resembled the plaintiff's statutory claim. The court con-
cluded that "the cause of action given by Section 7 of the Clayton
Act fits into that broad field of tort law which protects a man's
business from wrongful interference .... The statute simply makes
an addition to this group of recognized torts. 17 1
Within its factual context, the Williamson court's conclusion is
sound. The defendant was alleged to have interfered with Inland's
business by abusing illegally obtained control. Such conduct closely
resembles the common-law tort of wrongful interference with a
trade or calling.7 2 Similarly, the predatory pricing tactics allegedly
practiced by the Sabre Shipping defendants in their attempt to de-
stroy Sabre's business constituted an interference within the gen-
eral scope of the wrongful-interference tort doctrine. Indeed, quite
apart from the antitrust laws, courts exercising a common-law
jurisdiction have deemed predatory pricing to be tortious on a
wrongful-interference theory.73
Not all antitrust violations, however, necessarily amount to
wrongful interference. El Camino Glass involved no claim that the
defendants attempted to destroy or otherwise interfere with the
plaintiffs' businesses. Rather, the plaintiffs claimed that the defen-
dants received excessive consideration from them through price-
fixing. Williamson's holding, therefore, does not fit the facts of El
Camino Glass. Nevertheless, Williamson supplies a workable mode of
inquiry for characterizing private antitrust liability of all sorts:
What common-law form of action most closely resembles the plain-
tiff's statutory action? Antitrust violations that do not interfere with
70 110 F.2d at 17. See notes 64-65 and accompanying text supra.
71 110 F.2d at 18.72 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 708-816 (1938), cited in Williamson v. Columbia Gas
& Elec. Co., 110 F.2d at 18. An 1898 Illinois case presents a clear statement of what
constitutes the tort of wrongful interference: "No persons, individually or by combination,
have the right to directly or indirectly interfere or disturb another in his lawful business or
occupation, or to threaten to do so, for the sake of compelling him to do some act which,
in his judgment, his own interest does not require." Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608,
614, 52 N.E. 924, 925 (1898).
73 See, e.g., Boggs v. Duncan-Schell Furn. Co., 163 Iowa 106, 115-17, 143 N.W. 482,
486 (1913); Memphis Steam Laundry-Cleaners, Inc. v. Lindsey, 192 Miss. 224, 238-39, 5
So. 2d 227, 232 (1941). See generally 30 AM. JUR. Interference § 40 (1940).
1978]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:682
a plaintiff's business, but merely result in the defendant's unjust
enrichment at the plaintiff's expense, more closely resemble quasi-
contract than tort. 74 This conclusion draws support from two quar-
ters: the common-law treatment of usury, and the common-law
treatment of overcharges exacted by public utilities and common
carriers.
The allegedly excessive commodity charges of El Camino Glass
resemble usurious interest charges. Each case involves breach of a
statutory prohibition giving rise to unjust enrichment. Unlike the
cause of action in El Camino Glass, however, the private rights of
action bestowed by modern usury statutes have common-law coun-
terparts.7 5 At common law, a suit for recovery of usurious interest
payments lay in a common count for money had and received-not
in tort. 76
The misconduct alleged in El Camino Glass also resembles the
exaction of overcharges by a public utility or common carrier.77
U Exacting excess profits through the unlawful exercise of market power results in
"the receipt of a benefit the retention of which is unjust, and requiring the obligor to make
restitution." F. WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS § 3, at 4 (1913). Such transfers
can be conceptualized in two ways. One way is to view the defendants' misconduct as a
kind of economic duress. This analysis has been applied to abuses of economic power by
common carriers. See id. §§ 220, 221; Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure I, 20 N.C.L. REv.
237, 243-46 (1942). See also notes 77-81 and accompanying text infra. A second way to con-
ceptualize such transfers is to view the overcharges simply as mala prohibita, as in cases of
usurious lending. See notes 75-76 and accompanying text infra. Cf. F. WOODWARD, supra
§§ 222, 223 (courts apply both doctrines in allowing recovery of usurious interest). The
cause of action in either case sounds in quasi-contract.
The statutory trebling of damages, to the extent punitive, detracts from the conclu-
sion that private antitrust suits may be quasi-contractual, since punitive damages are gener-
ally unavailable in contract actions. See 5 S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1340 (3d ed.
1968). However, some states provide doubling or trebling of damages in usury actions,
which are essentially quasi-contractual. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1916-3 (West 1954 &
Supp. 1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 74, § 6 (1975). Furthermore, considerable evidence sug-
gests that the treble-damage remedy was largely aimed not at punishment, but at encour-
aging private enforcement of the antitrust laws. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTI-
TRUST PENALTIES 63-67 (1976). Multiple damages imposed for such a pragmatic purpose
are not inconsistent with the view that § 4 claims may be quasi-contractual in nature.
7- See generally F. WOODWARD, supra note 74, §§ 222, 223.
76 See Stock v. Meek, 35 Cal. 2d 809, 817, 221 P.2d 15, 20 (1950); Stone v. James, 142
Cal. App. 2d 738, 740, 299 P.2d 305, 307 (1956); Baum v. Thoms., 150 Ind. 378, 382, 50
N.E. 357, 358-60 (1898); Plitt v. Kaufman, 188 Md. 606, 612, 53 A.2d 673, 676 (1947);
Neuscheler v. See, 131 N.J.L. 368, 371, 36 A.2d 753, 754-55 (1944); State Bank v. Lanam,
34 Okla. 485, 487, 126 P. 220, 221 (1912); Edwards v. Surety Finance Co., 176 Wash. 534,
537, 30 P.2d 225, 226-27 (1934); Wood v. Lake, 13 Wis. 84, 96 (1860).
7
'The Supreme Court's decision in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
392 U.S. 481 (1968), illustrates this parallel. The Court considered whether proof that a
private antitrust plaintiff had "passed-on" illegal overcharges would defeat the plaintiff's
suit to recover them. The Court rejected United Shoe's pass-on defense, relying in part on
its earlier decision in Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531
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Both instances involve receipts of supra-competitive prices through
the exercise of functionally identical economic power.78 In contrast
with its posture toward most restraints of trade,7 9 the common law
refused to tolerate abuses of economic power by public service
entities; it provided affirmative rights of action to persons forced to
pay unreasonable rates.8 0 The weight of authority characterizes this
form of action, too, as a common count for money had and re-
ceived.81
The Williamson approach of analogizing the statutory antitrust
action to similar common-law actions therefore leads to the conclu-
sion that the private antitrust claim in El Camino Glass sounded not
in tort but in quasi-contract. Under this analysis, the El Camino
Glass court erred in relying on the common-law rule against con-
tribution among joint tortfeasors. Nor should it be surprising that
the law of tort does not subsume all private antitrust liability. The
great variety of acts that can give rise to such liability would seem
to defy uniform characterization. Sabre Shipping and El Camino
Glass, along with the great weight of authority, imply a contrary
view, but one that is largely unreasoned.82 The potentially crip-
pling losses that can accompany a denial of contribution require a
less perfunctory approach to defining the nature of private anti-
trust liability and hence the scope of the common-law rule.
(1918), a non-antitrust case that rejected a railroad's pass-on defense in a suit for the res-
titution of excessive freight charges. 392 U.S. at 490 & n.8.
7SSee C. WILCOX, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 275-76 (4th ed. 1971).
79 See notes 64-65 and accompanying text supra.
80 See Dalzell, supra note 74, at 243-46.
81 See Mobile & M. Ry. v. Steiner, McGehee & Co., 61 Ala. 559, 595 (1878); Cullen v.
Seaboard Air Line R.R., 63 Fla. 122, 129, 58 So. 182, 184 (1912); Boston v. Edison Elec.
Illum. Co., 242 Mass. 305, 310, 136 N.E. 113, 116 (1922); E.D. Clough & Co. v. Boston &
M.R.R., 77 N.H. 222, 251, 90 A. 863, 876-77 (1914) (dissenting opinion); Jeremy Fuel &
Grain Co. v. Denver & R.G.R.R., 60 Utah 153, 156, 207 P. 155, 156 (1922); Dalzell, supra
note 74, at 243-46. But see Graham v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 53 Wis. 473, 482, 10 N.W.
609, 612 (1881).
The Supreme Court has stated in dictum that the exaction of "exorbitant" overcharges
by a common carrier is a tort. Lewis-Simas-Jones Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 654, 660
(1931). In so stating, however, the Court relied entirely on Smith v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,
49 Wis. 443, 5 N.W. 240 (1880), an overcharge case which held nothing of the sort. Smith
noted that the "foundation" of the plaintiff's action was in the nature of money had and
received. Where the defendant had overcharged fraudulently, however, the plaintiff's ac-
tion also sounded in tort. Id. at 448, 5 N.W. at 241-242. The Court in Lewis did not cite the
subsequent decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Graham v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
Ry., 53 Wis. 473, 482, 10 N.W. 609, 612 (1881), which extended Smith's tort holding to all
rate overcharge cases. Thus, Lewis's exclusive reliance on Smith suggests that the Court
might have used the word "exorbitant" to limit its dictum. In any event, the Lewis dictum
and the Wisconsin cases are contrary to the majority view.
s2 See note 68 supra.
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C. Policy Considerations
In Cooper Stevedoring, the Supreme Court suggested that per-
mitting contribution among negligent tortfeasors leads to a "more
equal distribution of justice." '83 Even before Cooper Stevedoring, this
kind of reasoning had caused lower federal courts, in contexts
other than antitrust, to expressly repudiate the common-law rule, 84
or to find ways of circumventing it.85 Moreover, since 1959 the
number of jurisdictions permitting some form of contribution
among joint tortfeasors has increased from twenty-seven 86 to
thirty-eight.87 Although aware of these trends, the courts in Sabre
Shipping88 and El Camino Glass89 advanced three policy reasons for
denying contribution among antitrust "tortfeasors": (1) congres-
sional intent; (2) protection of plaintiffs' ability to control the scope
of their lawsuits and to obtain settlements; and (3) deterrence of
83417 U.S. at 111 (quoting The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 14 (1890)).
4 See, e.g., Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 1974).
85 Even where the securities laws have not expressly provided for contribution courts
have permitted it on the general principle that the securities laws are to be administered in
pari materia. See Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971); deHaas v. Empire
Petrol. Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815-16 (D. Colo. 1968), modified on other grounds, 435 F.2d
1228 (10th Cir. 1970). In Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 467-69 (3d Cir. 1968), the
Third Circuit exhibited similar activism by anticipating that the Virgin Islands would re-
nounce the common-law rule against contribution among joint tortfeasors.
88 Comment, Adjusting Losses AmongJoint Tortfeasors in Vehicular Collision Cases, 68 YALE
L.J. 964, 969-70 (1959).
87 See George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Skin-
ner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977); Na-
tional Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 260 Iowa 163, 147 N.W.2d 839
(1967); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963); Grothe v. Shaffer, 305 Minn.
17, 232 N.W.2d 227 (1975); Royal Indem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 193 Neb. 752, 229
N.W.2d 183 (1975); Wurtzinger v. Jacobs, 33 Wis. 2d 703, 148 N.W.2d 86 (1967); ALASKA
STAT. § 09.16.010 (1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1002 (1962); CAL. Cxv. PROC. CODE § 875
(West Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. § 6302 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31 (West Supp.
1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2012 (Supp. 1977); HAw. REV. STAT. § 663-12 (1976); IDAHO
CODE § 6-803 (Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 412.030 (Baldwin 1977); LA. CiV. CODE
ANN. art. 2103 (West Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 17 (1972); MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 231B, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2925(1) (Supp. 1977);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.060 (1969); NEV. REV. STAT. §
17.225 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-2 (West 1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-12
(1954); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 1401 (McKinney 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § lB-I (1969 &
Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-01 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.440 (1977); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2083 (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-6-3 (Supp. 1977); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-8-12 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3102 (Supp. 1977); TEX.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 2212 (Vernon 1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-39 (1977); VA. CODE §
8.01-34 (1977); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-13 (1966); WYO. STAT. § 1-1-110 (1977).
88 298 F. Supp. at 1345.
89 [1977-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,533, at 72,111-12.
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antitrust violations. None of these justifications withstands critical
analysis.
1. Congressional Intent
The congressional intent argument involves two contentions.
The first, advanced in Sabre Shipping, is that since the antitrust laws,
unlike the securities laws, fail to provide for contribution, Congress
must have intended to deny contribution.9" This contention is un-
persuasive. The Supreme Court has stated that "[i]t is at best
treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a
controlling rule of law." 91 This caveat seems particularly applicable
to Sabre Shipping, in which the court decided a novel issue of law
that was unlikely to have attracted congressional attention. 92 Even
if Congress had taken note of the contribution issue, its silence
would still be of questionable significance since "[c]ongressional
inaction frequently betokens . . . preoccupation, or paralysis. '93
Sabre Shipping's reliance on a congressional failure to act was there-
fore misplaced. 94
90 See text accompanying note 15 supra.
91 Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946). Accord, Gooding v. United States,
416 U.S. 430, 469 (1974) (dissenting opinion, Marshall, J.); NLRB v. Plasterers' Union, 404
U.S. 116, 129-30 (1974). See H. HART & M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1393-95 (tentative
ed. 1958).
92 Arguments based on congressional silence are most persuasive where the silence
follows a judicial development of the law. Even in these circumstances, however, the Su-
preme Court has generally been unwilling to give controlling weight to congressional inac-
tion. "It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congressional silence to
debar this Court from reexamining its own doctrines." Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106,
119 (1940). Compare Boys Markets, Inc. v. Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 240-42
(1970) (dictum) (Congress's failure to respond to Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370
U.S. 195 (1962), did not bar Court from overruling that decision, although it involved
controversial issue of statutory construction), with Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283-84
(1972) (50 years of congressional silence, coupled with repeated defeat of proposed reme-
dial legislation, signified congressional intent to preserve major-league baseball's judicially
created antitrust exemption). It follows that the Sabre Shipping court stood on especially
weak ground in relying on congressional silence when the issue was one of first impression.
93 Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 n.21 (1969). Other possible reasons for congres-
sional silence abound-e.g., political expedience, legislative indifference, and a belief that
other proposals have a stronger claim on the legislature's limited time and resources. See
H. HART & M. SACKS, supra note 91, at 1395-96.
"' Nor can Congress's failure to respond to Sabre Shipping be viewed as a reliable indi-
cation of legislative intent. See note 92 supra. The Supreme Court swept aside "tacit ratifica-
tion" arguments in both Boys Markets, Inc. v. Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235,
240-42 (1970), and Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1946), where Congress
had remained silent in the face of Supreme Court precedents of several years' standing.
The reasoning of those cases applies a fortiori to a district court precedent on a rarely
litigated issue.
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The second contention is more limited. The court in El Camino
Glass reasoned that because the antitrust laws are strict liability
statutes, a defendant's lack of intent to violate them should not
affect his entitlement to contribution. 95 This argument confuses
the issues of liability and apportionment. Although the imposition
of strict liability may reflect a congressional purpose to facilitate
private enforcement of the antitrust laws, that purpose would not
be compromised by allowing a defendant's lack of intent to figure
in a separate contribution action following judgment in the original
suit.96 Strict liability as between plaintiff and defendant does not
mandate strict liability as between the defendants themselves.
2. Protection of Plaintiffs' Control Over Litigation
The second policy reason advanced for applying the common-
law rule is that permitting contribution might interfere with plain-
tiffs' prosecution of their original actions. This argument also has
two facets. First, the Sabre Shipping court feared that the avail-
ability of contribution would inhibit settlements.97 The El Camino
Glass court, however, recognized that courts could fashion con-
tribution rules that avoid such inhibition by protecting the rights of
settling defendants. 98
Second, the courts in both Sabre Shipping and El Camino Glass
contended that permitting contribution would destroy plaintiffs'
95 [1977-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,533, at 72,112. The court's statement that the anti-
trust laws are strict liability statutes was an oversimplification. Under § 2 of the Sherman
Act (15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970)), combinations, conspiracies, and attempts to monopolize all re-
quire a showing of specific intent. See 16A J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
§§ 9.01(4), 9.02(5) (1969). See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. 2864,
2872-78 (1978).
'6 Admittedly, prejudice to the original plaintiff might result if defendants seek con-
tribution by way of cross-claims or third-party complaints. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) avoids this
problem, however, by authorizing the separate trial of these claims. See notes 100-05 and
accompanying text infra. Nevertheless, the court in El Camino Glass stated that "[sleverance
of the third party complaint is an uncertain and inadequate remedy." [1977-1] TRADE CAS.
(CCH) 61,533, at 72,112.
9 7 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
8 [1977-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,533, at 72,112 (citing Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394
F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1968)). See, e.g., Martello v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
Similarly, the UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORs ACT, which has been adopted
in 18 states, provides in § 4:
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given
in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or
the same wrongful death:
(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the in-
jury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against
the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant,
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ability to control the size and scope of their lawsuits. 99 Although
this argument is essentially sound, it suffers to the extent that Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) empowers trial judges to restore
such suits to their original proportions.100 Under Rule 42(b), where
a plaintiff is inconvenienced or prejudiced by a defendant's expan-
sion of his suit, the court, in its discretion, may order separate
trials. The El Camino Glass court dismissed this argument by saying
that "[s]everance of the third party complaint is an uncertain and
inadequate remedy."'' Despite the uncertainty inherent in any
discretionary remedy, the broad language of Rule 42(b) at least
poses no significant restrictions on a judge's power to grant sepa-
rate trials.
Moreover, misgivings about the adequacy of the remedy seem
ungrounded. Having ordered separate trials, the judge may limit
discovery to the segregated issues.' 02 Separation will confine the
trial of the original action to those issues that are relevant to the
plaintiff's claim; separated claims and parties will neither confuse
nor complicate the trial.'0 3 Finally, under Rule 54(b), 10 4 the origi-
or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and,
(b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for con-
tribution to any other tortfeasor.
99 See text accompanying notes 16 & 28 supra.
100 FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) provides: "The court, in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may
order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim ...."
101 [1977-1] TRADE GAS. (CCH) 61,533, at 72,112. The court did not expressly refer
to Rule 42(b). Since the court was briefed as to Rule 42(b) (separate trials), but not as to
Rule 21 (misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties) (see Memorandum of United Glass Com-
pany In Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Third Party Complaint at 23, El Camino Glass v.
Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 1 61,533 (N.D. Cal. 1976)), the court's use of
the word "severance" was probably an erroneous shorthand reference to separate trials
under Rule 42(b). Confusion of Rules 21 and 42(b) is common. See C. WRIGrr & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2387 (1971).
102 See Ellingson Timber Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 424 F.2d 497, 499 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970); Pegram, Separate Trials in Patent-Antitrust and Patent-
Unenforceability Litigation, 64 F.R.D. 185, 196 (1975).
103 "Other questions which might be brought in by the presence of the third party
need not breed confusion, since the trial judge, under the provisions of rule 42, has it
completely within his power to determine what issues shall be tried together and what
separately." Ford Motor Co. v. Milby, 210 F.2d 137, 139 (4th Cir. 1954).
104 FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides in part:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there
is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judg-
ment.
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nal plaintiff can obtain final judgment on his claim even if cross-
claims or third-party actions for contribution are still pending. 05
The Federal Rules thus provide adequate protection of the plain-
tiff's ability to control the size and scope of his lawsuit.
3. Deterrence
As a final justification for applying the common-law rule, El
Camino Glass suggests that denying contribution might enhance the
deterrent effect of private antitrust suits.' 0 6 Although the court
made no attempt to develop this idea, prevailing economic theory
lends it credibility. Economists have argued that business mana-
gers, particularly in larger organizations, are generally "risk
averse"-that is, they are deterred more by the slight prospect of a
large loss than by the strong prospect of a small loss.' 0 7 If this
hypothesis is correct, application of the rule denying contribution
should inhibit those managers who are aware of the rule from
participating in unlawful group activity: Although the rule de-
creases the likelihood that an individual participant will be held
liable, it increases the size of the potential liability.
Unfortunately, this inhibitory effect depends on managers'
awareness of the common-law rule. Unlike fines or penalties, which
most laymen readily understand, the concept of joint and several
liability, and the consequences of a rule denying contribution, are
probably not fully appreciated by many nonlawyers. Moreover, po-
tential fines and penalties can be calculated with reasonable preci-
sion. A participant in an anticompetitive conspiracy, however, even
if he understands the law, may be unaware of the extent of the
conspiracy, 10 8 and fail to appreciate the magnitude of his potential
liability. Thus, participants' ignorance of either the relevant legal
concepts or the extent of the wrongdoing with which they are
involved may limit the deterrent effect of the common-law rule.
Finally, denying contribution can consistently dete r only willful
lawbreakers; it will not inhibit many violations committed uninten-
105 See, e.g., United Bank v- .Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 529 F.2d 490, 492-93
(10th Cir. 1976). See generally 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.23[2], 54.36 (2d ed.
1976).
106 "[T]he court believes that the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws may be increased
by not permitting defendants to redistribute the cost of an antitrust violation." [1977-1]
TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,533, at 72,112.
107 See, e.g., K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 74, at 120-29.
l0 Cf., e.g., Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 556-59 (1947)(salesmen of il-
legally priced whiskey unaware of conspiracy's exact limits).
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tionally or in response to economic coercion. 10 9 Thus, the deter-
rence rationale provides at best a weak justification for blanket
denial of contribution.
III
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO CONTRIBUTION AMONG
PRIVATE ANTITRUST DEFENDANTS
The discussion in the preceding section highlighted a number
of practical and conceptual shortcomings in the present denial of
contribution among private antitrust defendants. Briefly sum-
marized, the main problems lie in (1) adherence to the mistaken
view that contribution remains generally unavailable among joint
tortfeasors at federal common law; (2) the assumption that all anti-
trust violators are tortfeasors, regardless of the particular nature
of their acts or the laws violated; and (3) reliance on weak policy
arguments for denying contribution among all private antitrust de-
fendants. These difficulties, combined with the common-law rule's
obvious inequities and open invitation to collusion, 110 support the
scholarly commentators' nearly unanimous condemnation of the
rule.'
All antitrust violators are not equal. They range from the pre-
datory price-cutter who ruthlessly eliminates competitors to the
helpless franchisee of a giant corporation, whose livelihood is
threatened if he fails to cooperate in his franchisor's anticompeti-
tive scheme. The view that all are "tortfeasors" and therefore
barred from seeking contribution is not only legally defective,112
but also fundamentally unfair.
A better approach would involve analyzing private antitrust
liability according to two variables: whether the liability is tortious,
and whether the party seeking contribution acted intentionally or
unintentionally. This analysis yields four possible combinations: (1)
intentional tortious harm (e.g., Sabre Shipping); (2) intentional non-
tortious harm; (3) unintentional tortious harm; and (4) uninten-
tional nontortious harm (e.g., El Camino Glass). The common-law
109 For an example of such coercion, see Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139-41 (1968).
110 For an example of such collusion, see Pennsylvania Co. v. West Penn Rys., 110
Ohio St. 516, 144 N.E. 51 (1924).
11 See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 50; Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between
Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130 (1932).
12 See notes 60-82 and accompanying text supra.
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rule should operate automatically to deny contribution only in
category (1). This category would include concerted refusals to deal,
predatory conspiracies, and other violations committed with the
intent to injure or destroy competitors. Antitrust violations involv-
ing malice and intent to injure fall within the scope of the
common-law rule and thus provide appropriate targets for a per se
approach. Conversely, the common-law rule should be wholly in-
applicable to violations within category (4). Here, the rule is inap-
posite because the violation is not a tort. 1 3 Moreover, harm caused
by nontortious acts, such as the diminution of wealth caused by "an
extravagant bill," 114 seems less invidious than harm caused by tor-
tious acts, especially when inflicted unintentionally. Here, the addi-
tional sanction of denying contribution is least appropriate. Subject
to procedural safeguards, 115 courts should therefore freely permit
contribution in cases of unintentional nontortious harm.
Categories (2) and (3) are more problematic. Although the
common-law rule is technically inapplicable to intentional nontor-
tious conduct,"16 perhaps the law should penalize all willful vio-
lators. Unintentional tortious conduct, on the other hand, techni-
cally falls within the scope of the traditional common-law rule.1 7
Thirty-eight states, however, now permit contribution in cases of
unintentional tort, 1 8 and the Supreme Court has evinced a similar
attitude." 9 Because conflicting considerations beset the issue of
contribution in these categories, courts should examine an addi-
tional factor-the comparative culpability of the parties. Where the
contribution-seeking party is an unintentional tortfeasor (category
(3)) and the party from whom contribution is sought is an inten-
tional tortfeasor (category (1)), contribution is probably justified.
This conclusion follows not only from the comparative culpability
of the parties, but also from the apparent liberalization of the fed-
eral rule against contribution with regard to unintentional
tortfeasors. 20 On the other hand, contribution should be denied
when the contribution-seeking party is an intentional nontortious
113 See notes 60-82 and accompanying text supra.
"I Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390,399 (1906) (Holmes,J.).
115 Under the proposed approach, judges should liberally allow the separate trial of
contribution actions to avoid complexity, delay, and confusion in the original action. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b); notes 99-105 and accompanying text supra.
116 See note 60 supra.
.. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 50.
11
' See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
119 See text accompanying notes 43-48 supra.
120 See notes 43-59 and accompanying text supra.
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violator (category (2)), and the party from whom contribution is
sought is an unintentional nontortious violator (category (4)). The
most difficult cases arise when both parties fall within a single
category (either (2) or (3)). In such cases, two factors suggest that
courts should be more willing to permit contribution among unin-
tentional tortfeasors (category (3)) than among intentional nontor-
tious violators (category (2)). First, the deterrent rationale for deny-
ing contribution applies primarily to intentional violators. 21 Sec-
ond, since the common-law rule is based on a refusal to recognize
equities in favor of wrongdoers that spring from their own wrong-
ful acts, 122 the defendant's state of mind rather than the legal label
given to his anticompetitive conduct ("tortious" or "nontortious")
would seem to be the better yardstick of culpability.
CONCLUSION
In Sabre Shipping and El Camino Glass, the only reported cases
that have squarely determined whether private antitrust defen-
dants are entitled to contribution, federal district courts adopted a
per se approach: antitrust violators are tortfeasors, and federal
common law prohibits contribution among joint tortfeasors. Both
of these assertions are doubtful. Recent cases suggest that federal
common law no longer denies contribution among all joint
tortfeasors. Moreover, not all antitrust violators are tortfeasors.
The policy arguments marshalled in favor of the per se approach
are also questionable. A more accurate and flexible analysis would
begin by taking two factors into account: whether the violation
giving rise to liability was tortious, and whether it was intentional.
If both factors are present, the common-law rule properly applies
and contribution should be denied; if both are absent, contribu-
tion should be allowed. In cases where only one factor is present,
courts must undertake the further task of weighing the relative
culpability of the parties to determine whether one should receive
contribution from another.
James W. Dabney
121 See notes 106-09 and accompanying text supra.
"'See note 1 supra.
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